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Price Theory and Anti-Takeover Laws:
Shareholder Protection in Illinois
VINCE GODDARD*
he onset of the "digital revolution" has created a dynamic and
precarious market for shareholders' and corporations. The
Tcurrent values of the technology stocks and the stock2
exchanges as a whole have defied all of the traditional valuation of stocks.
The massive increase in the value of the "tech stocks ' 3 has created a market
that is poised to see unprecedented levels of mergers and acquisitions. The
coming wave of acquisitions is a result of the extremely high stock
valuations and the dynamic nature of the "new economy." 4 As with any
new market, companies and managers are pushing the envelope of
entrepreneurialism. Inherent in the risk of being an entrepreneur is the risk
of market efficiency. Ineffective management becomes a market for raider
corporations. These unprofitable companies become targets for a more
profitable company to acquire and modernize the faltering corporation. The
precarious nature of the "new economy" makes the study of shareholder
laws and hostile takeovers all the more important. Inefficient laws will only
serve to hinder the growth of the new economy, leaving the particular state
behind in the advancement of the "digital revolution."
Being left behind in such a rapidly advancing economy will not only
injure the state's coffers as new corporations gravitate to friendlier
jurisdictions, but will ultimately cost the community as a whole in terms of
high-tech jobs, inflow of revenue, and community development. Antitakeover laws will become critical in the coming years as more and more
"new economy" corporations look to acquire the inefficient companies.

*
Vince Goddard graduated from Willamette University College of Law in
Salem, Oregon, and currently serves as an Assistant State's Attorney at the Kane County
State's Attorney's Office, Kane County, Illinois. The author wishes to thank his wife and
family for their support, and professors Jeffrey Standen and Robert Art for their insights and
guidance.
1. Greg Ip & E.S. Browning, Nasdaq Stocks' Swings Are Unprecedented - But
Taken in Stride, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2000, at Al.
2.
Id.
3. Id.
The "dynamic nature" of the new economy can be found in the sheer number of
4.
start-ups and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of the "dot com" corporations that was seen in
the late 1990s and early in 2000.
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The efficiency of the state and federal laws will determine how quickly the
United States will usher itself into the "digital revolution," and will
determine if American companies will dominate the interet age, or lag
behind the competition.
The digital revolution is certainly not limited to the growing
technology sector of the market. The transition of the economy as a whole
has, and will, gravitate toward the new technologies. This makes the "old
economy" corporations all the more susceptible to acquisitions.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of
Illinois shareholder protection law. The first part of this paper will focus on
the tools of economic analysis that will be used. The second part will focus
on the state of the law in Illinois with respect to hostile takeovers and
shareholder protections. Part three will apply the analytical tools to the
Illinois statutes to determine whether the statutes achieve the goals of
shareholder protection and market efficiency.
I. THE TOOLS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

A. WHY THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS?

Economics is the language of behaviors. Contrary to lay opinion,
economics is not centered primarily on the forces of money. Rather,
economics focuses on the behavior of rational individuals and how certain
choices are made.5 A "market" to the economist is simply a means of
describing how people react to various situations. Indeed, modem
economics has progressed to encompass a wide variety of behaviors: from
how criminals make choices on whether to break their silence,6 to how
judges should interpret the law.7 Money is simply an example that
economics uses to quantify behavior. Economics can be likened unto
physics: objects and people behave in certain manners when placed under
certain situations. As gravity acts on an object, economics acts on a rational
person.
The situations that give rise to corporate acquisitions fall squarely
within the field of economics. The shareholders must consider the tendered

5. Timothy Canova, The Macroeconomicsof William Vickrey, CHALLENGE, Mar.Apr. 1997.
1986).

6.
7.

Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1989).
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (3d ed.
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price in light of possibly removing the incumbent management. The
individual shareholder must then engage in an analysis of the most
profitable solution for the individual shareholder. Similarly, the incumbent
management must consider whether the tendered price should be accepted
or if potentially costly defensive measures should be initiated. Economic
analysis will assist in understanding whether state law helps the efficiency
of the market or unfairly "tips the scales" in favor of one side over the
other.
B. RATIONAL BUYER AND EFFICIENCY

To determine the effect of modem takeover legislation and how the
law will impact the efficiency of the new economy, one must turn to the
principles of economic analysis. Economics, like any science, must assume
8
certain conditions in order to render consistent analysis.
There is a presumption that the persons involved in tender offers are
rational individuals. 9 It is axiomatic in economics that a rational person is
someone who seeks wealth maximization. It is important to note that
"wealth maximization" is not simply a term that describes people wanting
more money. Wealth maximization is the concept that a good is more
valuable in the buyer's hands than in the seller's hands. It is incumbent on
economists to presume that buyers are parting with something of value to
acquire an object the buyer believes to be more valuable.10 Similarly, it is
assumed that the seller accepts the transaction because the object he is
selling is less valuable to the seller than the value the seller is receiving.
That these types of transactions can take place lends credence to the
efficiency of the market. Efficiency is a concept that is concerned with how
fluidly these transactions can take place. The absence of "red tape" and

8.
In other words, it makes no sense to hold specific variables constant that have
no bearing on the law. The presumptions that are advanced in this paper deal with the law,
such as the business judgment rule. Money-specific economic analysis must hold entirely
different variables constant such as money supply. These presumptions are necessary in any
science in order to understand the precise forces at work.
9.
This assumes rationality on all sides of the equation including the raider
corporation, their management and shareholders, all facets of the target corporation, and
indeed the lawmakers who voted to implement the anti-takeover laws.
10.
An analogy may be appropriate. A paintbrush in the hands of the average
person is worth the market price of the paintbrush. A paintbrush in the hands of Monet has
significantly more value. Deprived of his paintbrushes, the selling of a paintbrush to a
wanting Monet has the potential to be very lucrative.
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regulation is indicative of an efficient market."1 Efficiency allows people to
bargain and exchange goods without any form of coercion.
This 3allows the parties to come to a mutually beneficial agreement 2
for price.'
C. THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE MARKET

Theodore Grippo takes a controversial stance in his article with
respect to the criticism that the principle of economic analysis only applies
in a "perfectly competitive market."' 14 Competitive market forces are
always in motion, regardless of the political restraints that are
implemented. Competitive market principles such as wealth maximization
and rational buyers exist regardless of the form of government. A
monopolist, long considered the bane of all competitive markets, knows
from history that the monopoly will be short-lived even if the monopoly is
preserved through government subsidies.' 5 Cartels are forever in-fighting
due to the "chiseling effect" that occurs between the parties. 16 All of these
behaviors are competitive market phenomena despite the precise opposite
of "perfect competition" being present. 7 Competitive market forces are no
different from the law of gravity in that both always exist in varying
degrees.

11.
More precisely, efficiency to the economist is simply a market that remains at
its clearing price.
Indeed, the law is no stranger to this concept. Article 2 of the U.C.C. attempts
12.
to codify many of these concepts so as to honor the bargained-for-exchange in a sale. See
generallyU.C.C. § 2-106 (2000) (explaining "sale" in the context of Article 2); U.C.C. § 1103 (2000).
13.
The term price simply refers to anything of value such as labor, shares, time,
goods, or money.
. 14.
Theodore W. Grippo, In Defense of State Takeover Laws, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
273, 276 (1988).
An excellent example is the fall of the Fulton monopoly, in the landmark case
15.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), where the empire of Cornelius Vanderbilt
has its beginnings. Despite a state-granted monopoly, Vanderbilt broke the monopoly and
ushered in an entirely new concept: transatlantic travel by steamship at variable costs so that
even "common people" could afford the journey. ROBERT W. FULSOM JR., THE MYTH OF THE
ROBBER BARONS 2-5 (3d ed. 1996).
See HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 318 (1998).
16.
The behavior of actors within any market remains consistent with the "perfectly
17.
competitive" market theory. Evidence of this can be seen in the explanation of behavior
being consistent not only in the economic marketplace but in other areas as well. The
Friedmans discuss thig behavior as applying in areas of language, scientific knowledge, and
as part of scholarship. See MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 25-27 (5th ed. 1990) [hereinafter FREE To CHOOSE].
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If government imposes legislative impediments to the direct operation
of the market and market entrepreneurs, 18 then People will wealth
maximize by becoming "political entrepreneurs."
Regardless, the
behavior is precisely consistent with that of a "perfectly competitive"
market.
That a corporate acquisition occurs in a less than perfect market
situation is irrelevant. 20 So long as there are no elements of coercion acting
on the raider and the target, the market forces described above are always
acting on the transaction. This forces the tender offer to achieve a price that
will induce the target management and shareholders to accept, or the
management to defend. It will be argued that efficiency ought to be the
only goal of the law, and that from efficiency comes shareholder
protection. This is because an efficient market for corporate control gives
the shareholders an efficient price to consider. The shareholder is then free
to determine whether accepting the tender offer is in their best interest.2'
The question for the Illinois legislature is how much does the law affect the
efficiency of the market.
D. PRICE THEORY

Price theory refers to a body of economic principles, rather than a
specific theorem with detailed methods of procedure.22 This body of
economic principles is centered on how prices confer information to both
the buyer and seller.23 To some economists, price is all that is needed for

18.

See

23.

Id.

BURTON

W.

FULSOM JR., THE MYTH OF THE ROBBER BARONS

1-15 (3d ed.

1996).
19.
Fulsom argues that there are two types of entrepreneurs. "Those who tried to
succeed... through federal aid, pools, vote buying, or stock speculation we will classify as
political entrepreneurs.Those who tried to succeed... primarily by creating and marketing
a superior product at a low cost we will classify as market entrepreneurs." Id. at 1.
20. Under a price theory analysis, so long as price is communicated to the
shareholders, it does not matter if no information is known at all. The only aspect of a
takeover that is important in protecting the shareholders is the offer price. See discussion
infra Part II.D.
21.
It will be further argued that there is a market for efficient management.
Particularly with the rise of the digital revolution, the manner and means in which a
company does business will ultimately determine if that company is going to survive in the
new economy. See discussion infra Part lI.D.
22. See FREE TO CHOOSE, supra note 17, at 13-24.
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the buyer to make a rational choice.24 Milton Friedman is paramount to this
school of thought.25
These principles rest on the foundation of "elasticity." If a market is
elastic, the consumer has an array of choices. Sellers will compete for the
consumer in several manners, most common of which is offering the lowest
price for the best quality of the good. If the seller raises prices too high, the
26
consumer will simply buy another comparable product. Such a result
produces similar products at a similar price. Generally, the only variable
comes in the marketing, i.e. buying a brand name or buying higher quality.
Elasticity ensures that the price that is offered is a reflection of the market
price for the product. If the price were too high, consumers would buy a
similar good at the market price.
Price theory eliminates any need for a consumer to have a wealth of
information in order to know whether the price being offered accurately
reflects the market price.27 Indeed, the purchase of any good could be
affected by an almost infinite number of variables, from the price of oil in
28
the United States to technological improvements by competitors. The
market eliminates the need for a consumer to have access to this type of
omniscient information. Hayek stated that "the whole acts as one market,
not because any of its members surveys the whole field, but because their
limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many
29
intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all." Hayek
further concludes that the amount of information that a person needs in
30
order to make a rational choice is surprisingly small. Simply put, one does
not need to know the chemistry of internal combustion in order to purchase
a car, all one needs to know is the price. 31 The consumer, according to

24.

Id.

25. Although any number of articles by Milton Friedman gives reference to his
adherence to the accuracy of prices, for the most lucid and direct publication on price
theory, see MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (5th ed.
1990).
26. For example, if the price of Pepsi were twice the price of Coke, most consumers
would simply buy Coke instead of Pepsi because the goods are easily substituted. The ease
of substitution for a product is the essence of elasticity.
27. See BUTLER, supra note 16, at 52.
28. Both Milton Friedman and Friedreich Von Hayek have explored this concept at
length, and are widely considered the authorities on this subject. See FRIEDMAN, supra note
25; Friederich Von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519

(1945).
29.

30.

31.
94-96.

Hayek, supra note 28, at 526.
Id.

Hayek's findings are addressed in more detail infra text accompanying notes
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Hayek, knows that the car dealer purchased the car at the lowest market
price, the car manufacturer purchased the metal from the mines at the
lowest market price, etc.
The theory applies to all objects with a price.32 A shareholder need not
be a sophisticated money manager in order to act rationally in buying,
holding or selling stock; he need only know the price of the stock.33 Such a
conclusion is directly at odds with the justification that the Supreme Court
utilized in the Edgar v. MITE Corp. decision. 34 The Court stated in dicta
that "[w]e, therefore, agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress sought
to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary
information but also by withholding from management or the bidder any
undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice. '3 5
At best, the concerns of Congress and the Court are redundant to the
function of price. If price, as Hayek theorized and empirical studies have
shown,36 communicates all of the information that is relevant to the
shareholder, then legislation which mandates relevant information be
disclosed to the shareholders serves no purpose. The price of the tendered
shares already communicates to the shareholder whether the tendered
premiums are worth accepting or rejecting.

II. TAKEOVER LAWS IN ILLINOIS

A. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TAKEOVER LAWS TODAY

After the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois Business Takeover
Act,37 Illinois adopted a more neutral approach to takeover laws.38 Justice

32.
Indeed, price can be thought of in many different ways, outside of an object in a
store with a tag. For instance, the price of labor is expressed in terms of income; the price of
doing one thing can be expressed in terms of "opportunity cost," or the benefit that is being
forgone. See generally BUTLER, supra note 16, at 45 (explaining opportunity cost).
33.
See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 24-26 (7th
ed. 2000); supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
34.
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
35.
Id. at 634.
36.
See generally Shyam Sunder, Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey, in
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 445 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
37.
The Illinois Business Takeover Act was struck down by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Justice White, not writing for the
majority, stated that the Illinois law disturbed the balance of neutrality that Congress
intended to create between raiders and targets in the Williams Act. Id. at 634-35.
38.
Grippo, supra note 14, at 288.
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White suggested that the individual states could not disturb the balance that
Congress intended to create between the raider corporation and the target
corporation. 39 Furthermore, state laws could not directly regulate interstate
commerce by forcing corporations to comply with state standards of
regulation.4 °

The focus of the law in Illinois is the "fair price" of the target

42
corporation's stock.41 The "fair price" states focus their regulation of
43 The fair price laws require the
takeover actions in an indirect manner.
"interested shareholder"" to obtain director approval before the takeover
action. 45 Other states have adopted different approaches to anti-takeover
46
legislation, but these other forms are not the focus of this paper.
Federal law also plays into the analysis of the current status of state
v. MITE Corp.,47
anti-takeover laws. As Justice White suggested in Edgar
whether federal law preempts state law is determined by whether the
48
balance of neutrality has been shifted by state legislation. Finally, the
Court announced that so long as the state law is not inconsistent with the
basic principles of 50the Williams Act,49 the state law would pass

Constitutional muster.

Edgar,457 U.S. at 639.
39.
Id.
40.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(C)(2)(a)(ii) (2000).
41.
These include Illinois, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
42.
Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin. See
George C. Hook, What is Wrong with Takeover Legislation, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 293, 312
(1988).
Id.
43.
For a definition of "interested shareholder," see 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
44.
5/7.85(D)(2) (2000).
Such a provision can be found under 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(B) (2000),
45.
which requires board approval for "certain business combinations," or at least 80% of all
outstanding shares who could vote for a director.
These other forms of legislation include asset freeze legislation and control
46.
share legislation. Hook, supra note 42, at 313-22.
457 U.S. at 624.
47.
Phillip N. Hablutzel & David R. Selmer, Hostile CorporateTakeovers: History
48.
and Overview, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 203, 229 (1988).
Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 STAT. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13
49.
(1994)).
CTS Corp. v. Dynamic Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81-82 (1987).
50.
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B. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

In considering the efficiency of the Illinois anti-takeover statutes there
is a presumption that deference will be given to incumbent management
decision under the business judgment rule. 51 This concept is important
because it stands as a ready tool to be used by the incumbent management
to defend a decision to accept a takeover bid or to implement defensive
tactics. 52
Illinois courts have maintained strong adherence to the business
judgment rule, holding that the courts would not interfere absent a showing
of "fraud, illegality or conflict of interest. 53 In so holding, the Illinois
courts provide a more deferential approach to the decisions of management
than what other state courts, such as Delaware, would hold. 4 Regardless of
any additional statutory measures adopted by the Illinois legislature, strong
judicial precedent in Illinois favors the actions of the incumbent
management. By enacting redundant legislation for the dubious benefit of
shareholders,56 the Illinois legislature runs the risk, of burdening
corporations with more regulation or, at best, rendering the law effectively
trivial in relation to business actions the corporation would already have
taken.57
The counter balance to the business judgment rule is the common law
imposition of a "duty of loyalty. 5 8 While a common defensive tactic today,
the "poison pill" defensive tactic was precariously poised for an early
demise by the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. Household
International.59 The importance of Moran is found in the balance that the

51.
The business judgment rule is a pleading requirement from Rule 23.1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that has been applied in Illinois cases holding that
deference will be given to board members' decisions unless a plaintiff provides "a
reasonable basis for inferring that the board members were acting with self-interest, rather
than the corporation's interest, in mind." Lewis v. Hilton, 648 F. Supp. 725, 727 (N.D. I11.
1986).
52.
Ronald David Ellin, Note, The Poison Pill Warrant-ApothecaryandAntidote:
Moran v. Household International, Inc., 36 DEPAUL L. REv. 413, 417-20 (1987).
53.
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Il. App. Ct. 1968).
54.
Charles W. Murdock, Why Illinois? A Comparison of Illinois and Delaware
Jurisprudence,19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 12-15 (1994).
55.
A good example of such deference to management can be found in the famous
"Wrigley Field lights" case, Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777.
56.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982).
57.
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Approach 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 584-85 (1990).
58.
Id. at 584.
59.
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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courts use in approaching the defensive tactics of the incumbent
management. 60 The courts have structured an approach, to be established
by challengers, which is whether the directors have breached their duty of.
loyalty and their duty of care to the shareholders. 6 1 These are causes of
action that already exist in Illinois jurisprudence, 62 independent of any
additional statutes enacted by the Illinois legislature.63 The regulation of
corporation or its
defensive measures may be redundant, making the
64
burdens.
regulatory
trivial
to
shareholders susceptible
C. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

None of this discussion would be relevant if there existed no financial
incentives for strong corporations to acquire weaker ones. The raider
corporation must also fall under the "rational buyer" theory in order to
remain consistent with the economic principles detailed above. This simply
means that an acquiring corporation must be acting in a rational pursuit of
wealth maximization. Illinois benefits from being in the Seventh Circuit,
with economics-minded judges such as Judge Posner and Judge
Easterbrook.65 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has taken a strong leadership
66
position in the development of economic analysis and takeover law.
The market for corporate control provides a "hands-off' approach for
allowing business to regulate business.67 The theory is premised on a
vigorous entrepreneurial market seeking for weak management of a
corporation. 68 These entrepreneurs seek to replace the inefficient
management, thereby increasing the profits of the raider corporation
through hostile takeover bids. The consummation of the market for control

60. The considered defensive tactics are certainly not limited to the "poison pill."
Takeover litigation has led to a vast array of creative defensive tactics to prevent a raider's
bid. See Ellin, supra note 52, at 414.
Id. at 419.
61.
See, e.g., Treco v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984);
62.
Whittaker.v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. 1i. 1982).
See generally Murdock, supra note 54, at 14-19.
63.
64. Black, supra note 57, at 584-85.
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (3d ed.
65.
1986); Frank W. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
66. Dennis Honabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for
Corporate Control, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 681, 718 (1989).
Id. at 715.
67.
See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate
68.
Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71 (1989) (arguing for limitations on Directors' power to resist
takeovers so the market can regulate itself).
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is made by the raider corporation making a tender offer for the shares. The
shareholders then consider the offer price, and the theory of the rational
buyer begins anew.
The effect of the market for corporate control is to create a selfregulating means for equilibrium among the companies. The process is
market-Darwinism at its finest; the weak corporations are acquired by the
strong. The market, left untouched, creates equilibrium and efficiency.6 9
The concern that the states have in such "self-regulation" is unfair
practices, 70 such as bad faith defensive measures, also known as
"greenmail" and other anti-takeover measures taken only to safeguard the
incumbent management. 7'
The legitimacy that the states have in protecting their interests will not
be challenged in this paper.72 More important, since the Edgar decision, is
how much the Illinois statute 73 affects the equilibrium that the market
would otherwise provide. The ideal statute would properly balance the need
for the market to provide its own solutions to inefficient management,
against the interests of the state74 to protect companies that are incorporated
in Illinois and the people and communities that depend on the financial
health of an Illinois corporation.
D. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND ILLINOIS LAW AFTER EDGAR V. MITE CORP.

With the Supreme Court essentially affirming the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit in Edgar,75 the Seventh Circuit began to develop the
leading case law to evaluate a target corporation's board actions in defense
to a takeover.76 Since the Edgar decision, Illinois had to acquiesce to the

69.
Id.
70.
See generally Thomas J. Bamonte, ,The Dynamics of State Protectionism:A
Short Critiqueof the CTS Decision, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 259 (1988).
71.
Honabach & Dennis, supra note 66, at 702.
72.
Certainly, the rights of the state to regulate and protect their interests against
outside raider corporations was settled in a number of cases. E.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982).
73.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85 (2000).
74.
Regardless of the stated purpose for "shareholder protection" statutes, the clear
motivating factor in the promulgation of such laws is political. Politicians certainly do not
want workers in their districts to be displaced because of a raider corporation taking control
of a local company and then dismantling that company. For a discussion of such "political
imperfections" and the inevitability of "shareholder protection" laws, see Bamonte, supra
note 70, at 259.
75.
Honabach & Dennis, supra note 66, at 726.
76.
Id. at 681.
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will of the Supreme Court. As a result, Illinois' anti-takeover jurisprudence
has quieted."
The approach to anti-takeover tactics that the Seventh Circuit adopts is
the degree of influence that fiduciary duty should play when a court
reviews the actions of incumbent management. 78 Specifically, the court has
attempted to delineate the circumstances of when judicial intervention
under a fiduciary duty theory should supercede the typical deference given
under the business judgment rule. 79 The most common situation in which
this would arise is when the incumbent management undertakes a series of
defensive tactics. A second consideration, though incidental for purposes of
this paper, is the self-regulation provided by the shareholders as a whole in
a derivative action. 80
The Illinois Legislature may have provided the answer for the courts
in promulgating Chapter 135 of the Illinois Code. 81 The Illinois statute
regulating takeover bids adopts two general principles. First, the interested
shareholder must maintain the highest market price 82 "to every class and
series of outstanding shares. 83 The second characteristic of the Illinois
statute is that an 80% approval is required for "certain business
combinations," 84 which include takeover bids.
The requirement of a uniform price, and indeed the highest price per
share to be paid to all classes of stock, is far more germane to economic
analysis. Before economic analysis can be applied, careful consideration of
the mechanics and implications of Illinois' "fair price legislation" must be
addressed.
First, the Illinois statute is triggered once a shareholder obtains 15% of
the outstanding voting shares.85 Once the interested shareholder is
established, the statute requires a series of steps that must all be met in

77.
The Illinois state courts have not seen a great deal of activity with respect to
anti-takeover challenges. Certainly this aspect of litigation remains, but the current version
of chapter 132 has only been in effect since 1997.
78.
Those cases that have influenced the Seventh Circuit's reasoning are: MITE
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom.; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982); Panter v. Marshall Field, 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986)
rev'd in part, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods, 877 F.2d
496 (7th Cir. 1989). For a discussion on these cases see Honabach & Dennis, supra note 66.
79.
Panter,646 F.2d at 293; see also Honabach & Dennis, supra note 66, at 685.
80.
Spillyards v. Abboud, 662 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
81.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85 (2000).
82.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(C)(2)(a)(i) (2000).
83.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(C)(2)(b) (2000).

84.
85.

805

ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/7.85(B) (2000).

805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(D)(2) (2000).
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order for any "business combination" to be completed.8 6 The requirement
that the interested shareholder pay the same amount for all outstanding
shares addresses the "two-tiered" tender offer in an indirect manner.87 By88
only requiring that the interested shareholder pay the highest market value
for the class of shares, the raider is still permitted freedom in crafting the
tender offer. Also, by allowing the acquiring shareholder to function
outside of the statute if he does not acquire more than 15% of the
outstanding shares, further flexibility is afforded. 89
Another indirect aspect of the statute that is characteristic of fair price
statutes is that the interested shareholder need only initially deal with the
"disinterested directors." 90 This allows the interested shareholder to try and
convince the board of directors to acquiesce to the tender offer. If this
avenue fails, then the raider has the ability to tender directly to the
shareholders.
The power of the fair price statute is seen when the interested
shareholder must pay the minority.9 ' The raider must then engage in
economic reasoning as to whether the premium that must be paid in order
to establish control is worth the expected income that the raider intends to
gain.

III.

APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO THE LAW

A. ILLINOIS LAW, PRICE THEORY AND THE SHAREHOLDERS

The effect of the Illinois statute is one of indirect regulation of tender
offers. 92 The requirement for a uniform price being offered to the class of
shareholders obviously allows the shareholder to consider a single price for
the control of the corporation.93 The theories of Professor Von Hayek94

86.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(C)(2) (2000).
Hook, supra note 42, at 313.
87.
The statute looks to the price of the shares within a specific time period. The
88.
"window" runs from the "first trading day after announcement [of the bid by the interested
shareholder]." 805 ILL. COMa.STAT. 5/7.85(C)(2)(a)(ii) (2000).
89.
The 15% trigger refers only to Illinois law and corporations that fall subject to
the law. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(D)(2) (2000).
90.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(C)(1) (2000) (requiring that two-thirds of the
disinterested directors approve of the measure).
91.
Hook, supra note 42, at 314-15.
92..
See the fair price statute analysis supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
93.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(C)(2)(a)(ii) (2000).
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come into play as the shareholder makes a rational decision on whether to
accept the tender or reject the offer and maintain the corporation. The
shareholder need know nothing of the details of the tender offer or the
financial situation of the corporation, 95 only that the price of the tender is
acceptable or not. As noted economist Shyam Sunder wrote:
The Hayekian hypothesis about the importance of
informational role of prices in markets has received
consistent support. Dissemination of information, from
informed to the uninformed, and aggregation of individual
traders' diverse bits of information through the market
process alone have been shown to be concrete, verifiable
phenomena, bringing abstract theory into empirical
domain.96
In other words, according to both Hayek and Sunder, the price is all
that need be considered by the shareholders in order to make a rational
decision.
Economic analysis can only lead to the conclusion that the state laws
that affect these tender offers must not interfere with the prices in a manner
that would distort the market. The market provides the most efficient
means of allocating resources. 97 Price is the primary, if not the only,
mechanism that shareholders consider in the form of the tender offer.
Therefore, the Illinois law in applying only indirect regulation of that price
provides the most efficient means of crafting "anti-takeover" laws.98 The
Illinois law balances the forces effectively. On the one hand, the offer of
the raider is not substantially disturbed, allowing the shareholders to make
a rational decision on the uniform price. On the other hand, the corporate
management is permitted to respond as they see fit, knowing that regulation
from the courts will fall under the business judgment rule or a breach of

94.
Hayek's ideas regarding price theory are discussed supra text accompanying
notes 27-31.
95.
Certainly this information problem would already be addressed by the raider
corporation. The raider will alter (up or down) the tendered price to reflect the
circumstances of the target corporation. The raider will therefore offer the highest price
given the circumstances.
96.
Sunder, supra note 36, at 445.
97.
BUTLER, supra note 16, at 54.
98.
This is of course secondary to not having a law regulating tender offers at all,
and allowing the market to regulate itself. Completely free markets are truly the only purely
efficient means of resource allocation, but such a position is highly unlikely and therefore
not considered in depth.
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fiduciary duty. The market is effectively left to work on the decisions of the
actors.
Illinois has therefore adopted the only true shareholder protection, and
that is to allow shareholders to consider the price of the tender by their own
rational means. The shareholders, and not the state or the judiciary,
therefore decide who will guide the corporation to maximize their wealth. 99
The 80% vote requirement of the Illinois statute may be relevant to
economic analysis as a whole, but this portion of the statute is not relevant
to this paper.1'° This section deals with "business combinations" that
require shareholder approval, and not "hostile" tender offers. Nonetheless,
the foundations of price theory remain the same regardless of the
situation. °1 Whether a shareholder, or indeed 80% "of the outstanding
shares," will approve a business proposition is dependent on whether the
proposition will maximize their wealth. 0 2
B. ILLINOIS LAW, PRICE THEORY AND THE INCUMBENT MANAGEMENT

Similarly, the management acting as rational maximizers of wealth
need only consider the price of the tender offer. However, unlike the
shareholders, the board of directors may choose to initiate defensive
measures. Such an option does not change the analysis. The board will
engage in precisely the same analysis as the shareholders by considering
the various prices.10 3 Should the management decide to implement overly
defensive measures,1 4 the shareholders could respond by selling their stock
should they feel the measures would hurt profits. If the defensive measures

As Judge Easterbrook characterized it, "If managers are not maximizing the
99.
firm's value.., a bidder.., will make investors a higher offer. Investors tender; the bidder
gets control and changes things." Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods, 877 F.2d
496, 500 (7th Cir. 1989).
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(B) (2000).
100.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
101.
102.
BUTLER, supra note 16, at 7 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
The Nature of Man, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4-19 (1994)).
103.
It should be noted that a primary "price" that the incumbent management may
consider is their own salaries. Such a distinction does not change the analysis. The
underlying motives of the corporate officers do not affect the economic analysis at work.
Should the management stray too far in protecting their own jobs, they open themselves to a
"duty of loyalty" lawsuit.
104.
For example, taking on too much debt to deter the tender could be a defensive
measure.
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are successful, the market for corporate control has been effective,
assuming that the shareholders agree. °5
CONCLUSION

The law in Illinois allows the two sides to craft their takeovers and
defenses as they see fit, requiring only that the shareholders agree by a
majority of 80%,'06 and that the price be uniform. 10 7 Illinois, in adopting a
"hands-off' approach to the details of takeovers has given shareholders and
directors the best form of regulation - minimal regulation. Judge
Easterbrook summed up the effect of allowing the markets, through price,
to operate to the benefit of all:
A statute that precludes investors from receiving or
accepting a premium offer makes them worse off. It makes
the economy worse off too, because the higher bid reflects
the better use to which the bidder can put the target's
assets. (If the bidder can't improve the use of the assets, it
injures itself by paying a premium.)0 8
Provided that the new law' °9 does not suffer from amendments that
will impede the current position of a laissez-faire approach, Illinois stands
poised to effectively navigate the coming digital revolution.

105.
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods, 877 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir.
1989).
106.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.85(B) (2000).
107.
805 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7.85(C)(2)(a)(i) (2000).
108.
Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 500.
109.
The Illinois takeover statute was amended in 1997. Pub. L. No. 90-461, § 5,
1997 Ili. Laws 5214, 5215-23.

